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WAYS AND MEANS OF CLOSING THE
INTERNATIONAL BORDER OF A COUNTRY,
IN WHICH INSURGENCY EXISTS, TO THE
MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLA FORCES AND
SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES

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SUBJECT: Ways and means of closing the international border of a country, in which insurgency exists, to the movement of guerrilla forces and support from outside sources.

1. PROBLEM. To effectively separate insurgent forces from vitally needed reinforcements, logistical support, and training bases which are located in "safe areas" across international borders.
2. ASSUMPTIONS.
 - a. That the United States will be called upon to assist in future counterinsurgent operations. Areas of interest will probably be in Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America.
 - b. Unlimited resources are not available, since there exists the possibility of encountering this problem simultaneously in more than one area of the world.
 - c. That a coordinated effort will be implemented utilizing Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and equipment; and that such a plan must clearly define areas of responsibility in order to preclude a duplication of effort.
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. The Communists do not isolate military affairs from political affairs, therefore military planners must not disregard the possibility of exploiting political considerations when contemplating border sealing operations. (2,4,7:89)
 - b. The use of a continuous barrier system, as was utilized by France in Algeria, is a classic example of the effective utilization of resources and manpower. (4,5:2,6:23)
 - c. U.S. Forces are presently conducting denial operations against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. These conditions can be duplicated in many areas of the world where U.S. Forces might be committed for future operations. (1)
 - d. Complete reliance on conventional concepts of warfare is not feasible in an insurgent situation. Failures in the past have resulted not from the lack of resources, but rather from the improper employment of available resources. (9:3,9:7,9:93)
4. DISCUSSION.
 - a. The sealing of international borders is a political act using military resources. Therefore it is necessary to accomplish political agreements with bordering countries so that a cooperative effort can be directed against infil-

traters. (9:98). Consequently military planners should request that appropriate civilian agencies begin negotiations for agreements as soon as a decision is made to commit U.S. Forces to help counter an insurgent situation. If agreements can be obtained they should include the following minimum provisions -

- (1) The utilization of the border countries' armed forces at designated check points. (Under supervision of U.S. advisors).
- (2) Permission to conduct necessary engineer operations. Operations would include, but not be limited to clearing border areas, and erecting barrier systems.
- (3) A standard identification card to be used by authorized border crossers of both countries.
- (4) Monetary compensation for personnel and equipment used in conjunction with our operations.

b. In the spring of 1957, France was faced with the problem of an ever increasing number of weapons being brought from neighboring countries into Algeria. Consequently military and political measures were implemented to curtail the flow of men and material from these outside sources. (4,5:1)

- (1) Political Measures. The French Government announced in August 1957 that it would pursue rebel Algerian forces into Tunisia. This was not extensively done however, due to the large manpower requirements necessary to conduct this type of operation. (4,5:1)
- (2) Military measures. A continuous wire barrier system was erected approximately 25 miles inside the Algerian border. (6:4). This barrier extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the edge of the Sahara Desert, a distance of approximately 200 miles. (5:1)
(Annex A)

c. Attempts to control the border areas in Viet Nam are presently being conducted in accordance with guidance as outlined in current U.S. Army Field Manuals.

- (1) General guidance outlined in FM 31-16 consists of the following objectives, techniques, and concepts.

(a) Objectives. (3:71)

- (1) Locate ingress/egress routes and crossing sites.

- (2) Determine the frequency and volume of crossing.
 - (3) Determine the type of transportation used.
 - (4) Locate probable "safe havens" across an international border.
- (b) Techniques, as they apply to land operations.
- (1) Coordinated patrols.
 - (2) Static observation and security posts along riverlines, and good ground lines of communications.
 - (3) Reaction forces.
 - (4) Aerial observers.
 - (5) Electronic devices.
 - (6) Effective centralized coordination and control.
- (c) Operational concepts.
- (1) "Restricted zones" are established in order to restrict the movement of personnel in and out of the border areas. Civilian personnel are made aware of the fact that anyone, not a member of the surveillance forces, will be treated as an enemy. Vegetation should be cleared in order to facilitate good observation and also to clearly identify the "off limits" areas to civilians. (3:71)
 - (2) "Friendly Population Buffers" are created in order to insure that personnel along the border areas are trustworthy. Civilians who are unsympathetic to the counter-insurgent cause, should be relocated to areas in the interior. Those remaining should be utilized in an intelligence system. (3:72)
- (2) Special Forces operations, conducted along the Cambodian border, have included some of the techniques as listed in paragraph 4 c (b) above, with emphasis on static posts; and reliance on reaction forces to protect forward posts and assist in the capture or killing of border crossers.
- (1) (Annex B).

- d. A reorientation of thinking is necessary if commanders are going to successfully quell insurgent movements. Many commanders from western nations have been too thoroughly conditioned to conventional warfare by their formal training and experience. Unconventional war requires a new approach, for as Trinquier states "...traditional forces no longer enjoy their accustomed decisive role" (9:6)
- e. When unconventional warfare units are employed they should be utilized in their unconventional role in order to capitalize on their training and potential. This is especially true in border denial operations. (2)
- f. The Greek Civil War is an example of the ineffective employment of conventional forces in border denial operations. Both the conventional offensive campaign and attempts to guard an infinite number of mountain passes, failed to halt communist aid to the insurgents. The aid from Yugoslavia was not halted due to the efforts of the Greek Army, but rather as a result of Tito's own action to stop shipments to the Greek rebels via Albania. (9:98). Colonel J.C. Murray summed up the situation in this way. " Indeed this (Tito's decision to stop shipments to the Greek rebels) may have been the proximate cause of the guerrilla collapse. (8:46)

5. CONCLUSIONS.


- a. Department of the Army Field Manuals give general guidance for conducting border denial operations. Border denial operations were successfully conducted in Algeria using many of the techniques which are presently included in these Department of the Army Field Manuals.
- b. All techniques itemized in paragraph 4 are valid if applied in a timely manner. The specific use of one, or a combination of these techniques, depends upon the state of insurgency, number and types of available troops, and the terrain.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

- a. Recommend that U.S. Army border denial operations be conducted as soon as U.S. personnel are committed to action in an insurgent area. Consideration should be given to the simultaneous employment of a variety of techniques such as those listed in paragraph 4 c (1) (b). An analysis can be made of those techniques which most appropriately apply to the situation. Workable techniques should then be extensively and aggressively employed.
- b. Recommend that U.S. Special Forces not be employed in roles which can just as skillfully

be handled by conventional forces. A more appropriate role for Special Forces personnel is to train small bands of indigenous units to operate within a country which is supplying aid to insurgent forces. Once the units are trained they could move into their area of operations by boat, foot, parachute, or any other available means. Security is the major consideration when selecting a method for movement of these units. Principal targets would be logistical bases, training centers, and the rendezvous points for border crossers. The advantages of using indigenous Special Forces in this role would be as follows:

- (1) The enemy's "rear area" would be disorganized, and consequently the flow of supplies would be either reduced, or stopped before reaching the border.
- (2) If attacks were aggressive and continuous, enemy morale would be adversely affected. The possibility would then exist for voluntary recruitment of captured enemy personnel either to serve with friendly units, or as infiltrators with the enemy units.
- (3) Heavy losses would force the enemy to substantially increase the security of units as they moved toward the borders. This increased size would present more lucrative targets for the Special Forces units.
- (4) Units operating across the border would be able to report any movement to border posts. This would allow adequate time for the border force, made up of conventional units, to properly deploy at an appropriate place for decisive combat.
- (5) As personnel in these SF units became more familiar with the ethnic groups and terrain, consideration would then be given to having them volunteer to serve with the enemy. The infiltration of enemy units by SF personnel would result in increased, and more accurate intelligence information.


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ANNEXES: A - Barrier System - Bone to El Ma
 El Abiod
 B - A Special Forces Border Denial
 Operation
 X - Bibliography

CONCURRENCES: (Omitted)
NONCONCURRENCES: (Omitted)
CONSIDERATION OF NONCONCURRENCES: (Omitted)
ANNEXES ADDED: (Omitted)

ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:

Date: _____

Approved(disapproved),including(excluding)exceptions.

Signature

ANNEX A --Barrier System - Bone to El Ma El Abiod.


1. Initially the barrier was quite primitive but it was gradually improved so that eventually it became an elaborate system consisting of aprons of barbed wire, electrified wire, and mines. Maintenance roads and patrol roads were constructed within the wire systems. (Appendix 1 to Annex A) (4)
2. Additional measures included the relocating of families and the burning of villages in order to create a "no man's land". The removal of all indigenous personnel made it possible for troop commanders to treat as enemy, any indigenous personnel found in the area. (5:1)
3. The barrier was augmented by the use of -
 - (a) Armored and foot patrols. (6:11)
 - (b) Radar. (6:23)
 - (c) Searchlights. (5:2)
 - (d) Observation aircraft which were employed both day and night. (5:2)
 - (e) Mobile reaction forces; consisting of infantry and tanks. (6:11)
 - (f) Chemical agents to remove existing vegetation. (6:6)
 - (g) The planting of brambles at strategic points to discourage breaching attempts. (6:21)
 - (h) Permanent lighting (approximately 50 miles) (6:21)
 - (i) Mesh fences, placed forward of the barrier, were used to "snag" and prematurely detonate explosive breaching devices, or anti-tank rounds which were fired at the armored patrols. (5:2, 6:4)
4. Factors to be considered in this type of operation.
 - (a) Considerable manpower is required for this type of operation. The French used five engineer battalions in order to construct the initial system. (6:6)
 - (b) Basic equipment used for construction. (6:23)
 - (1) Approximately 800 miles of electrical wire.
 - (2) Approximately 1000 miles of dirt roads complementing the system.
 - (3) Approximately 120 miles of hard top roads.

CONTINUATION OF ANNEX A

- (4) More than 1,000,000 anti-personnel mines.
- (c) Total construction time was 4 months.
(6:6)
- (d) Continual maintenance was performed in order to insure all devices were effective, and also to repair any damage done as a result of breaching attempts. (4)
- (e) The manpower required for continual surveillance and maintenance drained heavily on the total personnel available in the theater of operations. (4) For example 3 parachute regiments and 2 armored regiments were used to man the barrier.(6:11)
- (f) Total cost was approximately 4 million dollars. (6:4)

5. Results.

This operation can be rated as a successful border denial operation. (9:100). As a result of the reduction in aid from Tunisia, the Algerian rebels were forced to reduce their organization from company size units into small bands of 12 men or less. (5:2)



BARRIER SYSTEM BONE TO EL ANA EL ABIDD

ANNEX B --A Special Forces Border Denial Operation.

1. General. This is one type of Special Forces operation that was conducted along the border between Vietnam and Cambodia in 1963. (1)
2. Personnel. (1)
 - a. One Special Forces team.
 - b. Three observation post teams. (The number varied with assigned strength).
 - c. Reserve Forces (Normally company size).
3. Operational Concepts. (1)
 - a. A forward observation base (FOB) was established by the S F team to provide the following functions:
 - (1) Supervise and train the personnel of the OPs and Reserve Force.
 - (2) Serve as a communication center for the OPs.
 - (3) Report all intelligence information to the next higher headquarters.
 - (4) Serve as the logistical base for all assigned U.S. and Vietnamese Personnel.
 - b. A static observation post was initially manned by a joint SF-Vietnamese team. After the Vietnamese reached the desired degree of training, they operated the OP and the SF personnel only conducted supervisory visits. In addition to operating the OP, the 18 man OP team had the responsibility for conducting patrols between the OPs. These patrols were conducted in order to gain intelligence information, and to provide security for adjacent OPs and the FOB.
4. Results.

The operation of static OPs, complemented with adequate reserves, produced acceptable results, however this system was used along the Cambodian border where movement was somewhat less than on the North-South Vietnam border.

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